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Strategic Management Technical Skills, Interpersonal Skills and Conceptual Skills of Officers in Manning KRI

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A B S T R A C T

To achieve increased professionalism, the officers were disturbed by several shipwrecks that occurred. During the period 2013-2016, there have been 32 KRI accidents, the data can show an increasing trend of KRI accidents. In the maritime world, several ship accidents occur due to, among others, natural conditions, technical failures, shipping lane conditions, ship-related factors, human error, and cargo-related factors. This research uses a qualitative research approach with a case study method. From the research results, the ship which weighs 1,900 tons, has dimensions of 90.70 meters x 11.12 meters x 3.4 meters, is powered by 2 diesel engines, which can propel the ship up to a speed of 18 knots and can carry cargo up to 600 tons. happened when the ship finished docking. The habit factor of the ships above, anchoring like that, of course, has a reason, the Commander should in the learning process find out to enrich knowledge through experience to find the truth of the habit because one day it becomes one of the keys to work effectiveness and benefits in taking an action. If he learns from experience, leakage can be avoided. The results of the research show that expertise and responsibility are two of the pillars of professionalism, which are relevant to the case study of the shipwreck that the researcher lifted. The results of the ship accident case study, identified that to prevent accidents, officers must have technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills. These three factors constitute a totality. This means that all three are interrelated and all KRI officers need some mix of all three. If one of them is not perfect or does not exist, it will have implications for shipping safety.

1. Introduction

To achieve increased professionalism, the officers were disturbed by several shipwrecks that occurred. During the period 2013-2016, there have been 32 KRI accidents, the data can show an increasing trend of KRI accidents. And in 2017, there have been 12 accidents. Asops Kasal as Chief of the Sailor Corps, on April 12, 2018, in the Yos Sudarso hall, gave directions to the seafaring corps officers to improve their professionalism, to achieve zero accidents following the leader's policy. In the maritime world, several ship accidents occur due to, among others, natural conditions, technical failures, shipping lane conditions, ship-related factors, human error, and cargo-related factors. (Akten, 2006) Based on the results of a survey of 1,500 accident insurance claims worldwide between 1987 and 1996, the Thomas Miller P & I Club in the UK found that 90% of accidents are caused by human error. From the results of several comparisons of the causes of accidents above, the researchers also suspect that several KRI accidents are attached to the professionalism of officers, including decision making that is not based on conceptual skills, lack of effective communication, the ability to apply technical skills and obligations in

responding to mandates. This is what attracted the attention of researchers to raise the issue of professionalism of KRI officers in this study as a case study.

2. Literature Review

Conceptual skills

Conceptual Skills, these skills are related to an individual's ability to think beyond the task at hand. Robert (2006). An officer's specialty is the management of violence, not the act of violence itself. Harold Laswell is termed the manager of violence (Burhan, 2006). considering that there are various sources of a force of violence in the form of personnel, equipment, and weapons. For this reason, the duties of professional KRI officers include, 1) the organizing, equipping and training of this force, 2) the planning of its activities and 3) the direction of its operations in and out of combat. To do so, professional officers must be able to apply analysis, analytical insight, and intellectual sensitivity to study the work environment. (Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. 2012) Modern professional soldiers need to learn modern management skills and strategies. (Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. 2012).

Interpersonal skills

Poor communication is most often cited as a source of interpersonal conflict. Because individuals spend almost 70% of their waking time communicating. One of the most inhibiting forces for successful group performance is the lack of effective communication. A professional is not only required to develop skills and competencies in their field, but professionals must also develop skills for awareness of human behavior. The professional dimension is not only tied to conventional battlefield competencies, it also requires sensitivity to human factors that work beyond performance competencies. (Pesqueux, Y., & Damak-Ayadi, S. 2005).

Technical skills

Technical skills, these skills are related to an individual's specific area of expertise. Technical skill implies an understanding of, and proficiency in, a specific kind of activity, particularly one involving methods, processes, procedures, or techniques. (Muhaddjir Effendy, 2013)

Expertise consists of technical competence as well as organizational knowledge. Technical competence includes knowledge and repertoire of behaviors that can be used by someone to complete a task well. People usually master technical competence through formal education, on-the-job training or experience, the importance of technical competence for one's success and effectiveness and effectiveness as a leader.

Responsibility

Professionalism is not only interpreted as proficiency or ability to use weapons, but also the responsibility for his duties as a person in charge of national defense issues. The specific skills possessed by a military professional are not the only criteria that must be possessed by a professional, but there is an equally important criterion that a professional must have social responsibility (Hickman, G. R. 1998).

3. Methods

This research uses a qualitative research approach with a case study method. Qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. Qualitative methods rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis Qualitative methods and draw on diverse designs. At the implementation stage, to obtain valid and accountable data, the researchers continued to collect data through interviews, observations, and documentation.

4. Results and Discussion

Engineering skills

Technical skills are needed by an officer, in

addition to conceptual skills and interpersonal skills. The role of an officer as a leader, administrator, and supervisor on a ship requires technical skills in carrying out ship roles. Without these basic skills, a manager cannot effectively plan, direct, control, or assess work activities. (O'Neal. 1990) The technical expertise of a professional officer is the ability to apply knowledge by using the methods, processes, procedures, and techniques that have been mastered to carry out the ship's roles when the ship sails from point to point. From the results of interviews conducted in a semi-structured manner with the officers, the researchers obtained the answer that all KRI officers had good knowledge of the implementation of the ship's roles. The role is the way is taken by a series of behaviors carried out by the duties and responsibilities of the crew of the ship when carrying out various ship activities. Kasal Decree No. Skep/2831/VII/1995.

Likewise, the leak of the ship at Pondok Dayung pier occurred due to the stopper docking undocking pole stuck in the DG room which in the end the seawater flooded the entire room of the ship, causing the ship's hull to collapse to starboard. The role of the leak was carried out by the crew by carrying out delivery while at the same time finding the source of the leak and suction using a submersible pump until assistance by the Tug Boat was unable to cope with the slope. From the research results, the ship which weighs 1,900 tons, has dimensions of 90.70 meters x 11.12 meters x 3.4 meters, is powered by 2 diesel engines, which can propel the ship up to a speed of 18 knots, and can carry cargo up to 600 tons. happened when the ship finished docking. The purpose of the ship docked there is to re-stock and at any time ready to refuse for further operations. During the ship docking process, the weather was clear, the wind speed was ± 2 knots, and the highest tide was 1 meter. In carrying out the rear-facing role, the ship's crew is assisted by two tugboats docked at the bow and stern to help close the left hull ship as the fourth body on the right hull of KRI BPP. From the results of the study, the reason for leaning the left hull ship with the bow facing North was to make it easier for the ship to maneuver, if at any time ordered to move considering the ship was in operational standby status, and also to make it easier for refuel and wet materials.

During the process of docking the ship, the officer who brought the ship did not know that in the vicinity of the docking location there was a slipway docking/undocking stopper bollard owned by Fasharkan because there were no buoys installed at sea and the boundary signs installed on land were not visible because they were blocked by ships. leaning on the first body. According to Fasharkan officers and syahal personnel, they have been aware of the existence of a slipway stopper that has existed since 2007 and is used for ship docking and undocking. The docking limit sign relating to the presence of a slipway stopper is on the pier with the words "Danger Area". Before the ship docked, the syahal officer had been informed, to pay attention to the dangers of navigation and the dangers that existed in the Pondok Dayung dock area when the ship that was about to dock called for the scouting. The reason for the syahal officer to lean the ship on the fourth body at the Pondok Dayung pier is because so far the Frosch class ships have docked in the Pondok Dayung pier area, precisely next to the 3rd body KRI BPP and no other area can be allocated. By docking the right hull with the bow facing south. After ± 7 (seven) hours the ship docked, and the ship received a report from the guard officer that the ship leaked into the DG room.

Interpersonal skills

In an operational assignment, social interaction is very necessary to build intimacy between one soldier and another in a KRI community, so that they can work together and support each other for the achievement of successful operations. All research commanders interacted and communicated with the crew in various ways including, conducting

commander hours, coffee morning, at mealtime and after dinner, calling the crew specifically to chat or officers who intentionally took the time to attend the crew's room or also when active in various activities with his subordinates. The quantity of each research officer in carrying out the Commander's hours varies, there are once every two weeks, once a month, or only when the ship is about to leave for operations. Likewise, some officers delegate Commander hours to officers below them. When the KRI organization is vertical and the relationship pattern between superiors and subordinates is hierarchical in command and the KRI environment is rigid like other military environments, then the interactions carried out by all the research officers above are insufficient and even very lacking when faced with the length of operation and the task environment at sea. Due to the lack of interaction and the lack of maximum communication between officers and their crew members, an officer does not fully know in depth the characteristics and skills of all crew members. Losses occur because research officers who are not sufficiently proficient in problems but have the authority to solve problems, cannot hear all suggestions and input from their staff officers. In this factor, the three research vessels directly suffered losses due to this factor.

The leak that occurred at the Pondok Dayung pier in Jakarta, when they were going to dock the ship, palaksa, and kadivsenbah during the rear-facing role had advised the commander to lean the starboard side of the KRI BPP. The advice of the two officers was based on experience and habit, where ships of the Frosch class/type when docked at Pondok Dayung pier, their bows faced south. Likewise, what has been done by the syahal officer as the provider of the docking location has reminded the ship to pay attention to the dangers of navigation and the dangers that exist in the Pondok Dayung pier area. From the results of the research, the Commander accommodated and considered all suggestions and input from the ship's officers so that the ship docked on the starboard side. The commander ordered the palaksa to carry out the rear forward role, preparing the ship's ropes to dock the left hull. The reason for the Commander leaning on the left hull is because the ship is in a ready-to-operate status, if at any time it is ordered to refuse, it will be easier for the ship to get out of the dock. Submission of advice from the two officers was not sufficiently supported by facts in the form of navigational hazard identification signs to convince the Commander to change his decision so that the ship docked on the starboard side to avoid the dangers of navigation around the wharf. The commander is very reasonable to dock the left side because there is no buoy as a navigational hazard sign installed which should be there if there is a navigation hazard at that location.

When the ship was about to visually observe the position of the anchor lego on the ship that had a collision in Belawan waters, to the guard officers in the morning (08:00-12:00), the Commander ordered that the escort was complete to return to the patrol track. The commander ordered the ship to carry out anchoring at 20.00, by looking for a safe location, being in the anchor lego area that had been done previously according to the map, and to pay attention to the safe distance from ships that anchored around him. Previously, the commander had given directions on the implementation of the patrol sector around the MPMT to the southeast and northwest to the morning watch officer but did not know whether the commander had approved the anchor lego plan. Based on the results of the interview with the non-commissioned officer of navigation, said that the plan for the anchor point was made and is still in the vicinity of the patrol sector at a depth of 22 meters with a mud bottom and safe from navigational hazards and the basis for determining the lego point in the area is an anchor lego area with a distance of 2 NM from the framework. And has become an anchor lego reference before. From the results of the study, what the guard

officer knew was that after carrying out surveillance and security on the Royal Malaysian police ship, the ship approached the channel because it was able to establish communication with the Malaysian Royal Malaysian police ship and agreed to RV around buoy number one (1). After the ship carried out the alert and shadowing of the Malaysian police ship outwards, the Commander reminded again about the anchor lego plan at 20.00 without instructing to carry out sector patrols again. Moreover, the guard officers also did not receive clear instructions from the commander to make a track when carrying out patrols around Belawan waters after completing the escort of Malaysian police ships. Associated with the anchor lego position that will be used at 20.00, does not receive directives from the Commander.

Conceptual skills

An officer is the manager of violence, (Burhand, 2000). who has major duties and responsibilities in managing the ship organization? The success of an officer in managing the operations of his ship will not be separated from the ability of officers as managers in carrying out their functions and roles as professionals. To achieve a successful operation, an officer must be skilled in organizing, planning, and directing the source of the force of personnel violence, equipment, and weaponry contained on the ship, as well as in deciding a problem that occurs in the ship's organization. For this purpose, officers need concepts that are based on an understanding of ship organization, knowledge of the officer's task environment, and carrying out ship roles to an understanding of the ship's combat readiness and readiness. To have a positive effect on every successful operation, a ship's officer must have the ability to make a comprehensive, integrated, and precise operational plan. The results of this study indicate that there will never be a material loss to a system of defense equipment if it is led by officers who have conceptual abilities. Ships led by a leader who has conceptual skills are always successful in carrying out their duties. This study illustrates that the officer factor who has conceptual skills contributes significantly to the success of the ship carrying out its operational mission effectively or not. However, several incidents that caused material losses that occurred could not be separated from the ability of the officers to organize, plan and direct the source of this violence during shipping operations.

The ship that leaked into the Sea Strait started when the ship passed through the Sea Strait to get to the Kota Baru base. Consideration through the Sea Strait shipping lane is to avoid the high waves that occur in the Makassar Strait. This high wave causes the ship to sway and bob. The experience of the Commander who had been through the narrow strait added confidence to go through the channel and at the same time made the ship comfortable sailing after several days of experiencing shaking in the Java Sea. From the results of the interview, the Commander gave general orders, such as the procedure for a ship to enter a narrow shipping lane. The cruise is carried out at night with limited visibility. Before entering the Sea Strait shipping lane, the guard officer has prepared the shipping track. The track is made as it has become a habit that is done over and over again. When entering and the ship does not clarify to the local guide about traffic density, which areas deserve extra attention while passing through the channel, and navigational hazards that need to be watched out for. The ship was traveling at a speed of 12 knots when there was a collision with the shipwreck. The position of the shipwreck is not on the navigation map that is used as a reference. The ship experienced 2 collisions and was able to escape the navigational hazard.

The ship that crashed around Belawan waters, from the results of the study, occurred when a ship that wanted to observe the location of the anchor lego hit a shipwreck. Before heading to the anchor lego position, the ship carried out sector patrols followed by supervision and security (waspam) against the

Royal Malaysian police ship. The implementation of the anchor lego as a waiting position to enter the Belawan base the next day was carried out only verbally without being stated in the planning on the map. A process that aims to develop a tentative plan of operations that refers to a series of detailed ship actions on a shipping chart. The Commander's order to carry out sector patrols north of the MPMT buoy after completing the alert on the Royal Malaysian Police ship, pending the implementation of the anchor lego, received a different response. From the interview results, the duty officer felt that he did not receive instructions to return to carrying out sector patrols in a clear and detailed manner. So he decided to observe the location of the anchor lego, the duty officer did not analyze the surrounding aquatic environment and did not identify the dangers of navigation. He only reported having an anchor position in the east of the Belawan channel, which has often been used on voyages.

Regarding the ship that leaked Pondok Dayung, from the results of the research, the officer carrying the ship did not analyze the environment of the berth location first when the ship received a suggestion that the ship docked on the right side of the ship against the decision that would be taken to dock the left hull with the bow facing North on the fourth body in KRI BPP Pondok Dayung pier. From the results of the interview, the advice given is related to habit factors and information about the dangers of navigation around the berth area The officers did not follow up to assess the situation. To seek further new information and integrate it into a holistic picture of the actual water situation. As an officer with little experience of the situation in the water area, he does not place himself at all in a thorough understanding of the situation when discrepancies arise between the ship and its surroundings. And the obscurity of navigational hazards that "come to mind" is not visualized on the map. As for the consideration of the ship docking on the left hull, to make it easier for the ship to exit when ordered to operate, considering the exit is in the north and makes it easier for ships to carry out fuel buckets. The officers did not try their best to learn about their work environment. They did not find an answer about the strangeness of their environment when the ships next to them that had docked first took a position by leaning on the starboard side by the advice of their officers and following the long-standing habits of the Frosh and Parchim types of ships. The definitive officers try to study the situation, change the situation and make tactical considerations on the position of the berth on the facts and data through the latest nautical maps and navigational hazard markers found at the pier and identify the technical condition of the ship's draft with the tides around the sea. dock.

Similarly, what happened to the ship that had broken through the hull wall at Karang Jamuang Surabaya, from the results of the research as a result of the officers did not analyze the weather and identify the technical condition of the ship. From the interview results, the officers were surprised at the speed of the ship from the Ujung Surabaya pier before entering the waters of Karang Jamuang. The speed of the ship is accelerated by wind speed and strong currents during the trip out of the APBS channel, the ship is moving above its cruising speed, its speed is increasing, if normal weather the speed of the ship only reaches 6 knots, in this situation it can be 11-12 knots. As a result of this speed, the officers did not calculate, plot, and suggest avoidance actions from bad weather areas but emphasized that the ship continued to sail when the officers wanted to return to base considering the bad weather, strong winds, and waves hitting the ship as high as 1-2 meters along the way made the ship sway and nod irregularly which caused the contents of the ship to be destroyed. It was different when the ship arrived in the waters of Karang Jamuang, the ship experienced delays and even did not experience speed, what happened was the rain that fell accompanied by strong winds caused waves as high as 2-4 meters hitting the bow, stern and hull which caused the ship

to sway up to 30°. In this situation, the Commander decided to turn right to return to the APBS shipping lane to avoid bad weather.

Responsibility

During shipping operations, ships are faced with great risks. As a mobile chivalry environment, the activities and living spaces of crew members are surrounded by flammable and explosive materials at any time. Working conditions in the middle of the ocean easily cause boredom, boredom and quickly make physically tired which causes lazy to move, and not alert to dangers and threats that come. All ships that move in the ocean are influenced by natural factors. Natural conditions do not always help ships maneuver, even in bad weather conditions, storms, strong winds, and high waves above 2 meters in most Indonesian waters become obstacles or cause ship accidents. High sedimentation on sea lanes causes vulnerability to ship movement, high salt levels in Indonesian waters, causing the corrosion rate of ship buildings to deteriorate faster, and a land environment that is not managed properly causes the surrounding marine waters to become dirty of all kinds which are also not uncommon. cause shipwreck as well.

Likewise, the technical condition of the ship, material fatigue, or imperfection factors in ship repair are also the main causes of ship accidents. The ship is manned by a Navy soldier's compliance rate of the organization only reached 70%. And that also happened in KRI-KRI. so that the crew on the ship does not reach 100%. As a result, there are combat posts that are not manned by crew members or one crew member has two or three responsibilities to his combat post. To understand his job properly, an officer must have an idea about the relationship of his job to the various fields of the environment around him and the ways that support the goals of those fields of knowledge. Moreover, he will not be able to develop his analytical skills, insight, imagination, and judgment if he does not receive training. The researcher considers that the intellectuality of the military profession requires officers to dedicate at least a third of their professional life to undergoing formal education that is passed by the strata of rank.

5. Discussion

Engineering skills

The leak in the ship's DG space at the Pondok Dayung pier occurred because the way the ship was docked was contrary to the old custom. The technique of leaning the Frosh class ship on the Pondok Paddle pier with the bow always facing south means that the ship is docked on the starboard side. This is done to protect the stern of the ship from navigational hazards. Expertise is the focus of professionalism gained through education and experience. (Stepen..) In the process of learning technical skills are obtained through formal and non-formal education. When first docking at Pondok Dayung Selatan pier, KRI officers can learn from previous ship officers or at least see what the three ships that have docked before have done.

The officers have had a career on the ship, and have repeatedly and repeatedly docked at the Pondok Dayung pier including docking at the pier where the ship leaked due to a stopper docking undocking bollard, they should have been able to see the facts of habit, Parchim class ships and Frosh if the dock is always docked by leaning the ship on the starboard side with the bow facing south. The factor of the habit of the ships above docking like that of course has a reason, the Commander should in the learning process find out to enrich knowledge through experience to find the truth of the habit because one day it becomes one of the keys to work effectiveness and benefits in taking an action. If he learns from experience, leakage can be avoided.

Interpersonal skills

Interpersonal skills are the ability to work together, understand and motivate individuals and groups.

(Stepen, P) When the decision has been made, a duty officer needs his crew members to work together to pass the channel, he cannot work alone through the channel that he owns at night when visibility is limited besides he also doesn't know much about the environment. These waters are subject to many navigational hazards, in the form of shallowness, stranded ships that have not been marked with navigational buoys, and sea corals that grow along the coast.

Conceptual skills

Conceptual skills are also mental abilities to analyze and diagnose complex situations. (Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. 2012). With the knowledge he has, every officer should be able to analyze and study complex situations and develop strategies for the smooth operation of the ship's mission. This also affects the decision-making process in dealing with a problem. They must also have the ability to predict changes that can occur in the field of assignment and analyze each of these changes into problem components to find the source of a problem. So in the voyage, each officer should make all possible alternative actions, this relates to things that limit how far the action can be carried out. Can arrange the variables of the problem, with the data that has been collected and it is better if the data is in numerical form to facilitate calculations because these variables can affect the achievement of operating goals.

Responsibility

The responsibility of each ship's officer is to maintain, maintain the buoyancy of the ship, the readiness of the weapon system, control, and propulsion as well as improve the readiness and preparedness of the ship covering the areas of personnel, materials, and procedures. Responsibility is a matter of sensitivity, listening more intensely to something very close, and being a part of the self personally. Responsibility is the ability to respond or respond to his actions. The leak that occurred at the Pondok Dayung pier was due to the commander not responding to suggestions from the surrounding environment so as not to lean the left hull ship with concrete actions. Before the Commander concludes to close his ship, he should be able to listen to the advice of officers and his environment seriously to make a decision. Responsibility is not a formal attitude that can only be shown through appearance, but responsibility is a response. creativity that is given when accepting obligations as a leader.

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to describe professionalism from the perspective of expertise and responsibility when officers manned ship roles that caused material losses during the period 2013-2016. The results of the research show that expertise and responsibility are two of the pillars of professionalism, which are relevant to the case study of the shipwreck that the researcher lifted. The results of the ship accident case study identified that to prevent accidents, officers must have technical, interpersonal, and conceptual skills. These three factors constitute a totality. This means that all three are interrelated and all KRI officers need some mix of all three. If one of them is not perfect or does not exist, it will have implications for shipping safety.

The findings of this study further clarify the concept of officer professionalism because it more fully reveals the factors of responsibility than is revealed through theoretical studies. Responsibility is not just carrying out obligations as well as possible and having a positive impact on the Navy, then explaining the actions that have been taken while carrying out obligations and acknowledging the consequences of their actions, and being willing to take the risks, as has been disclosed by all responsible officers. against accidents that occur, but more than that, as a virtue that requires awareness and responsiveness to what must happen and what is expected or will happen.

The responsibility of KRI officers is to prepare, maintain, and improve the combat readiness of their ships. The application of this responsibility requires mastery of skills, mastery of skills requires responsibility. The obligation is made consciously, critically, and rationally, whether or not the ship carried by the officers is capable of technical conditions and in dealing with the environment and weather conditions, by the procedural principles regulated and the moral awareness of the profession to the extent that it is meaningful to the crew. ship and country. In the end, the researcher can conclude that expertise and responsibility have implications for ship accidents that occurred the period 2013-2016.

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